Theoretical Evaluation of Li et al.'s Approach for Improving a Binary
  Watermark-Based Scheme in Remote Sensing Data Communications by Khosravi, Mohammad Reza & Moghimi, Mohammad Kazem
  
ABSTRACT: 
This letter is about a principal weakness of the published article by Li et al. in 2014. It seems that the mentioned work 
has a terrible conceptual mistake while presenting its theoretical approach. In fact, the work has tried to design a new 
attack and its effective solution for a basic watermarking algorithm by Zhu et al. published in 2013, however in 
practice, we show the Li et al.'s approach is not correct to obtain the aim. For disproof of the incorrect approach, we 
only apply a numerical example as the counterexample of the Li et al.'s approach. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
       In 2013, Zhu et al. have presented their new 
watermarking algorithm for copyright protection of 
remote sensing images [1] which have specific features 
in terms of intensity, edge, texture and so on [3-8] (e.g. 
the case in Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. A sample for remote sensing images [4,8] 
 
 
       In 2014, Li et al. [2] have introduced a 
modification for Zhu et al.'s scheme. In fact, Li et al. 
firstly tried to find a security hole in Zhu et al.'s 
scheme and then proposed a certain attack for this 
scheme. And finally, they solved the problem regarding 
to this attack by introducing a solution based on a 
chaotic hash function. In this letter, Li et al.'s work was 
strongly disproved because we believe discovering the 
security hole in their work has a problem and in the 
other words, there is no hole in the Zhu et al.'s scheme. 
Thus, all modifications done for improving the basic 
algorithm are principally unnecessary. 
 
2.  THEORETICAL EVALUATION 
       According to third part in [2], in the original 
scheme [1,3] although all of the pixels in the host 
image I  are summed, the final achieved check bit b  is 
just a bit. To make b  equal to binary watermark 
W which is a bit of the encrypted watermark to be 
embedded, at most one pixel in the image will be 
reserved, as stated in fifth step of watermark 
embedding process of the original image [2]. It means 
that the embedded binary watermark W can be 
changed by varying just one pixel of the watermarked 
image I  which opens a security hole. Details of the 
designed attack for this aim are as below [2]: 
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Step1: For the image I  (or the block i, jI  in [1], 
equivalently), compute sum(I)mod 2  to obtain an 
original binary check bitb .  
Step2: For the image I  (the attacker image) in which 
another watermark W  is embedded in it, compute 
sum(I) mod 2  to obtain another binary check bit b . 
Step3: If b is equal to b , do nothing; else, reverse (do 
complementation) each pixel in I . 
 
       According to [2] and after performing the above 
steps, the watermark W  embedded in original 
watermarked image is replaced with W of the 
attacker's image. In [2] and after these steps, the 
authors have done some proofs and presented solutions 
for the attack problem, however, they have accepted 
steps 1 to 3 as a lemma without any proof and exactly 
this case creates a weakness, because accuracy of these 
steps is not considered. We are going to disprove it by a 
solved numerical example. If these steps become 
disproved, then all concluded items based on these 
approaches will be disproved. 
       Assume that we have a 2 2  host image with 
depth 2-bit as follow: 
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And the attacker's image is the same of original host 
image, this issue is not forbidden according to [2], but 
we can select I  different from I . 
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Also, assume original binary watermark W  and the 
attacker's binary watermark W  are as follow: 

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       According to step (3) of attack process, an enough 
way for attack is b b . We now see with using two 
images I  and I  as Eq. (1) and Eq. (2); 
 6 mod 2 0  b b . Therefore, we complete embedding 
process and then extraction process and finally will see 
in this example that W  will not be replaced with W , 
against step (3). If I  and 
I  are watermarked images 
based on {I, W}  and {I, W} , respectively, then they are 
computable using embedding process of the original 
scheme [1], as below: 

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       As a result, with using I , 
I  and check bits 
 0 b b , we perform extraction process of the 
original scheme and compute extracted watermarks 
extractedW  and extractedW . 
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3.  CONCLUSION 
       Thus by solving a numerical example, we showed 
W  was not replaced with W ; in the other words, we 
disproved  the Li et al.'s approach for improving the 
Zhu et al.'s watermarking scheme only by a 
counterexample. 
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